Levels of reasons why and answers to why questions by Lawler, Insa & NC DOCKS at The University of North Carolina at Greensboro
Levels of reasons why and answers to why questions 
 
By: Insa Lawler 
 
Lawler, I. (2019). Levels of reasons why and answers to why questions. Philosophy of Science 
86(1), 168-177. 
 
Made available courtesy of University of Chicago Press: https://doi.org/10.1086/701073 
 
***© 2019 Philosophy of Science Association. Reprinted with permission. No further 
reproduction is authorized without written permission from University of Chicago Press. 
This version of the document is not the version of record. Figures and/or pictures may be 
missing from this format of the document. *** 
 
Abstract: 
 
According to Skow, correct answers to why questions cite only causes or grounds, but not 
nonaccidental regularities. Accounts that cite nonaccidental regularities typically confuse 
second-level reasons with first-level reasons. Only causes and grounds are first-level reasons 
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Levels of Reasons Why and Answers
to Why QuestionsInsa Lawler*y
According to Skow, correct answers to why questions cite only causes or grounds, but
not nonaccidental regularities. Accounts that cite nonaccidental regularities typically con-
fuse second-level reasons with first-level reasons. Only causes and grounds are first-level
reasons why. Nonaccidental regularities are second-level reasons why. I first show that
Skow’s arguments for the accusation of confusion depend on the independent thesis that
only citations of first-level reasons why are (parts of ) answers to why questions. Then I
argue that this thesis is false. Consequently, the claim that correct answers to why ques-
tions cite only causes or grounds is refuted as well.1. Introduction. Skow’s theory of reasons why (2016, 2017) is framed in
terms of a theory of answers to why questions regarding the “occurrence of
a concrete event” (2016, 27). A central claim is that correct answers to such
why questions cite only causes or (partial) grounds of the event in question,
but not nonaccidental regularities (2016, 3; 2017, 907). This claim is based
on a distinction between different levels of reasons why. Only causes and
grounds are ‘first-level reasons why’. Nonaccidental regularities are ‘second-
level reasons why’. Skow argues that accounts that cite nonaccidental regu-
larities in answers to why questions typically confuse second-level reasons
with first-level reasons (2016, chap. 4; 2017). This accusation is crucial to
Skow’s rebuttals of (putative) noncausal explanations, such as mathematical
explanations.*To contact the author, please write to: Institute for Philosophy II, Ruhr University Bo-
chum, Bochum, Germany; e-mail: insa.lawler@rub.de.
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DISCUSSION 169The level distinction plays an important role in Skow’s account. Unsur-
prisingly, it has been disputed (e.g., Baumgartner 2017; Pincock 2017; Lange
2018, 36). However, in what follows, I argue that even if the distinction were
granted and only causes and grounds were first-level reasons why, Skow’s ac-
cusation of confusion and his central claim that correct answers to why ques-
tions cite only causes or grounds can be refuted. I first show that Skow’s argu-
ments for the accusation as well as his arguments for the central claim crucially
depend on the independent thesis that only citations of first-level reasons why
are (parts of ) answers to why questions. Then I argue that this thesis is false.
Skow’s arguments against the claim that some answers to why questions are
conjunctions of citations of a first-level reason why and its second-level reason
why can be rebutted, and there are plausible arguments in favor of that claim.
Like Skow, I am exclusively concerned with why questions concerning
particular events.
2. A Putative Confusion of Levels of Reasons Why. According to sev-
eral accounts, nonaccidental regularities (such as laws) need to be or could
be cited in correct answers to why questions.1 The deductive-nomological
(D-N) account (Hempel and Oppenheim 1948), Friedman’s account (1974),
Railton’s account (1978), and Kitcher’s account (1989) include law-like state-
ments. Salmon and Lewis allow for citing causal regularities (Salmon 1984,
262, 274; Lewis 1986). Woodward and Hitchcock (2003) include invariant
generalizations. According to Lange (2013), some answers to why questions
appeal to necessities. An explanation for someone’s not being able to cross all
of Königsberg’s bridges exactly once cites both that the bridge arrangement
has a particular property and that it is necessary that if a bridge arrangement
has this property, one cannot cross all of the bridges exactly once (488–91).
According to Skow, all these accounts are mistaken. Correct answers to
why questions cite only causes or grounds, but not nonaccidental regulari-
ties (2016, chap. 4.3; 2017).2 He argues that the mistake is due to a confu-
sion of different levels of reasons why (2017). For instance, Woodward’s
account “rests on a confusion of levels of reasons why in much the same
way the DN model did forty years earlier” (2016, 95). Before I turn to eval-
uating this accusation, I introduce the different levels of reasons why.
2.1. Reasons Why. Skow follows accounts that tie why questions to
reasons why (2016, 26–27; examples: Achinstein 1975, 29–30; Brogaard1. For the following discussion, it does not make a difference whether we consider to be
decisive the regularities’ nonaccidentalness or the fact that they obtain. What does matter
is whether any of them are citable in answers to why questions regarding particular events.
2. This claim is similar to remarks by Scriven (1959), as Skow points out (2016, 84–85).
170 INSA LAWLER2009, 461; Stanley 2011, 209). The basic form of answers to why questions
is “One reason why p is that q.”
Reasons why are particular facts (Skow 2016, 35). For instance, that her
diaphragmwas stimulated is a reasonwhy Juliana has the hiccups. Skow dis-
tinguishes between different levels of reasons why (2016, chap. 4.2; 2017,
907):First-Level Reasons Why. A fact F1 is a first-level reason why event E
occurred iff F1 is a reason why E occurred.
Second-Level ReasonsWhy.A fact F2 is a second-level reason why iff F2
is a reason why F1 is a reason why E occurred.Citing second-level reasons answers the ‘follow-up’ question “What
does F1 have to do with E?” or “Why is F1 a reason why E occurred?” (Skow
2016, 75, 80). Causal background conditions are examples of second-level
reasons. Take the question “Why did the match light?” (2016, chap. 4.2;
2017, 907): That someone struck the match is a first-level reason why the
match lit. That oxygen was present is a second-level reason why; it is a rea-
son why that someone struck the match is a reason why the match lit. Other
examples include nonaccidental regularities, such as laws (2016, chap. 4.2;
2017, 908): Skow illustrates this with the question “Why did the rock hit the
ground at a speed of 4.4 meters/second?”A first-level reason is that the rock
was dropped from a height of 1 meter. A second-level reason is the law
s 5
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
2dg
p
(s 5 impact speed, d 5 drop height, g 5 gravitational accelera-
tion near the earth’s surface ≈ 9.8, 4:4 ≈
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
2  1  9:8p ).
Second-level reasons why can be first-level reasons why. Take causal
background conditions: That oxygen was present is also a reason why the
match lit. However, according to Skow, nonaccidental regularities are not
first-level reasons why:Nonaccidental Regularities. Nonaccidental regularities are second-level
reasons why, but not first-level reasons why.For instance, that s 5
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
2dg
p
is not a reason why the impact speed was
4.4 meters/second (2017, 908). Skow does not argue for Nonaccidental Reg-
ularities. He likes “to put the burden on the other side: why think [laws] are
[first-level reasons why]?” (2017, 909). Skow further claims that only causes
and grounds are first-level reasons why (2016, chap. 3; 2017, 907–9):Causes and Grounds. Only causes and (partial) grounds are first-level
reasons why.
DISCUSSION 171His argumentative strategy is to take Causes and Grounds as initially
plausible and to defend it against putative counterexamples. I do not discuss
Nonaccidental Regularities andCauses andGrounds, but take them for granted
(for some discussion, see, e.g., Baumgartner [2017]; Pincock [2017]; Lange
[2018, 36]). Instead, inwhat follows, I challenge Skow’s claims about second-
level reasons why and answers to why questions.
2.2. The Accusation of Confusion Revisited. Let us get back to the ac-
cusation of confusion. Skow accuses Hempel of “inaugurat[ing] a long tradi-
tion of confusing the two levels of reasons” (2016, 81). The alleged confusion
underlying the citing of nonaccidental regularities in answers to why ques-
tions is to take nonaccidental regularities to be first-level reasons why. Ac-
cording to Skow, this confusion is due to particular pragmatic effects (2017,
909): We think that laws are first-level reasons because they are often cited
in good responses to an asked why question. Skow illustrates his point as fol-
lows: “she asks me why [the rock] hit the ground at 4.4 meters/second. I re-
spond, ‘Well, I dropped it from 1 meter up, and impact speed s is related to
drop height d by the law s 5
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
2dg
p
(and of course
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
2  1  9:8p ≈ 4:4)’”
(909). This is a fine response. However, this does not mean that the law is a
first-level reason why:My response is a good one, but it does not follow that every part of my
response is part of an answer to the question asked. In my view, the first
part of my response—“I dropped it from 1 meter”—is an answer to the
explicit question (“why did the rock hit the ground at 4.4 meters/sec-
ond?”), but the second part, the law, is not. It, instead, is an answer to
an unasked follow-up why question, a follow-up question I can anticipate
would be asked immediately if I only answered the explicit question. The
follow-up is, why is the fact that I dropped it from 1 meter up a reason why
it hit the ground at 4.4 meters/second? (Skow 2017, 910–11)So Skow’s stance is that citing neither the law nor its application is part
of the answer to the question “Why did the rock hit the ground at 4.4 me-
ters/second?” They are just part of a good response to it. The law citation is
an answer to an anticipated follow-up question. The confusion of different
levels of reasons why is a confusion of good responses and proper answers.
The same holds true in the case of the Königsberg bridges example. Skow
suggests that Lange mistakenly takes a second-level reason (the necessity of
not being able to cross all of the bridge exactly once) to be part of the an-
swer to the relevant why question (2016, chap. 5.3; 2017, 913–14).
2.3. Why There Is Probably No Confusion of Levels of Reasons Why.
The accusation that so many of Skow’s rival accounts make such an ele-
172 INSA LAWLERmentary confusion is puzzling. In fact, none of those accounts is committed
to the claim that nonaccidental regularities are first-level reasons why.3 Here
is why: Taking citations of second-level reasons to be parts of answers why
p does not mean that one classifies second-level reasons as first-level rea-
sons. How one classifies reasons is one thing and what one counts as part
of an answer is another. These issues are independent of each other. Claim-
ing that correct answers to why questions (could) cite nonaccidental regu-
larities is compatible with agreeing that such regularities are not first-level
reasons why.
Skow’s accusation becomes less puzzling when one realizes that he
makes the following assumption (2017, 907):3. Fo
couldWhy Questions. Correct answers to why questions cite only first-level
reasons why.Skow endorses Why Questions at the outset of his account. According to
Skow, complete answers as to why p are conjunctions of elements of the
form “One reason why p is that q” (2016, 42, 51); that is, they are conjunc-
tions of citations of first-level reasons why.
Skow is so convinced of Why Questions that he interprets his opponents’
accounts as sharing it. This leads to descriptions of their accounts as clas-
sifying all facts that are cited in answers to why questions as first-level rea-
sons. For instance, he claims that the D-N account “take[s] certain second-
level reasons, laws of nature, to also be first-level reasons” (2017, 908) and
that “Salmon’s view . . . is that all the other facts . . . are really part of the
answer to the question (in my preferred terms, they really are [first-level]
reasons why)” (2016, 93). However, these descriptions are likely to be false.
The defenders of rival accounts are not committed to accepting Why Ques-
tions. Skow neglects the vivid possibility that his opponents simply reject
Why Questions.
Skow’s accusation of confusion as well as his claim that correct answers
to why questions cite only causes or grounds essentially depend on Why
Questions. If second-level reasons why could be cited in answers to why
questions, there would be no basis for accusing others of conflating differ-
ent levels of reasons why, and the claim that answers to why questions cite
only causes or grounds would be refuted as well. So let us turn to examining
the plausibility of Why Questions.
3. Second-Level Reasons Why and Answers to Why Questions. As we
have seen, Skow assumes that answers to why questions cite only first-levelr a different rebuttal of the accusation, see Pincock (2017). He argues that there
be a disagreement about the nature of first-level reasons why.
DISCUSSION 173reasons why. He considers this assumption to be uncontroversial (2016,
51). According to him, the only thing that should be controversial is what
first-level reasons why are (25). As I have argued, this is not the case. In-
stead, it seems to be controversial what kinds of facts are citable in answers
to why questions. Although Skow does not give explicit arguments for ex-
cluding citations of second-level reasons, his accusation of confusion re-
veals two arguments for it. In what follows, I first rebut these arguments.
Then I offer arguments against excluding citations of second-level reasons.
3.1. Arguments for Excluding Second-Level Reasons Why. According
to Skow, citations of second-level reasons are only parts of a good response
to an asked why question, but not proper parts of the answer to it. His rea-
soning reveals two arguments for excluding second-level reasons: (i) Citing
second-level reasons answers the closely related follow-up question “What
does F1 have to do with E?” (2017, 907). (ii) Citations of second-level rea-
sons why, taken by themselves, do not answer the question “Why did E oc-
cur?” For instance, s 5
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
2dg
p
, taken by itself, does not answer why the im-
pact speed was 4.4 meters/second.
Yet both arguments can be rebutted. The first argument is not compelling
because an answer to a question can clearly have parts that are also answers
to closely related questions. Take the question “Where did you park your
car?” and the reply “I parked it next to the building which is Juliana’s house
and the only building in the street with a blue roof.” The second part of the
which clause also expresses an answer to “How could one identify Juliana’s
house?” But this does not exclude it from being part of the answer to the
initial question. The answer simply specifies the location where the car is
parked in two complementary ways.
The second argument looks more promising. If we accept that non-
accidental regularities are not first-level reasons why p, it seems difficult
to argue that a citation of them, taken by itself, answers the why question.
However, even if so, the second argument can be rebutted. That a proposi-
tion, taken by itself, is not an answer to a question does not mean that it
could not be a part of an answer. Take the question “How did you rescue
her?” and as a reply “I jumped into the water, swam 5 meters, grabbed
her, and brought her ashore.” “I swam 5 meters,” taken by itself, is not
an answer to the question. But it is nonetheless a part of the conjunction,
and the latter is an answer to the question.
A third argument Skow might want to offer is that including citations of
second-level reasons why would amount to giving up his simple account of
answers to why questions. Arguably, the answer “The drop height is 1 meter
and s 5
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
2dg
p
” could not be stated in Skow’s preferred form “One reason
why p is that q.” A simple account of answers might have some intrinsic
value. But the alternative ‘because’ form works fine when one cites both
174 INSA LAWLERfirst-level and second-level reasons why, for example, “The impact speed
was 4.4 meters/second because the drop height is 1 meter and s 5
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
2dg
p
.”
As Skow himself notes, “‘reasons why’ answers and corresponding ‘be-
cause’ answers are often equivalent, in some sense” (2016, 23). If so, there
is room for an alternative simple account that features “p because . . .” prop-
ositions as the basic unit of answers to why questions.
3.2. Arguments against Excluding Second-Level Reasons Why. In or-
der to argue against Why Questions, one might argue that all answers to
why questions need to cite nonaccidental regularities, as Hempel would ar-
gue (1965, 349). One has to answer the follow-up question “What does F1
have to do with E?” in order to have an answer to the why question. How-
ever, it suffices to argue for the weaker claim that some answers to a why
question are a conjunction of a citation of a first-level reason why and a ci-
tation of its second-level reason why. So let us turn to arguments for such
conjunctions.
My first argument is concerned with the nature of complete answers to
why questions. Questions are not understood as speech acts here, but as
the content that is expressed by interrogative sentences (Skow 2016, 26–
27; see also, e.g., van Fraassen 1980, 137–38). Answers are understood as
propositions. An important issue discussed is whether answers have to be
determined relative to some subject. Are answers always answers for some
subject? If they were, one could rebut Why Questions as follows: In at least
some cases, what Skow considers to be the complete answer is not a com-
plete answer for every subject who lacks additional knowledge. Take the fol-
lowing example by Lange (2013): Amother has three children and 23 straw-
berries. According to Lange, the facts that jointly explain why she failed to
distribute the strawberries equally among them are that she has three chil-
dren and 23 strawberries and that three does not divide into 23. According
to Skow, the only facts that explain are the first two (2016, 112–13; 2018,
15). So the complete answer to the question “Why did Jane fail to distribute
the strawberries equally?” is “There are exactly two reasons why she failed:
She has three children and she has 23 strawberries.”As Skow notes himself,
“including only the reasons why Jane failed is apt to leave one’s audience
unsatisfied” (2016, 114). This is understated: Arguably, the putative com-
plete answer is unsatisfying for everyone who does not know (or recognize
the relevance of the fact) that three does not divide into 23. But if knowledge
or recognition of the latter is necessary for considering an answer to the
question satisfying, it seems plausible that the fact that three does not divide
into 23 is cited in the complete answer as to why Jane failed to distribute the
strawberries equally. Something similar could be true in the impact speed ex-
ample. Just stating that the drop height was 1 meter is not a complete answer
for everyone who does not know how drop height and impact speed are re-
DISCUSSION 175lated. A complete answer to this question cites the law or some other relevant
nonaccidental regularity. (Again, this does not mean that the law is a first-
level reason why.) This argument is not a pragmatic argument; it is based
on an assumption about the semantics of answers.
What if answers were not determined relative to some subject? In this
case, one could rebut Why Questions as follows: Every question has a sub-
ject matter, that is, a queried property or relation. For instance, the subject
matter of “Who robbed the bank?” is the property of being someone who
robbed the bank in question. A complete answer to this question specifies
all entities who fulfill this property.What is the subject matter of a why ques-
tion? One proposal that is general enough to capture the variety of why ques-
tions is that the subject matter of a why question is the property of being
something the event in question (explanatorily) depends on (adopted from
Kim [1994]). First-level reasons why fulfill this property. However, this also
holds true for second-level reasons why. That Jane failed to distribute the
strawberries equally among her children also depends on the fact that three
does not divide into 23 (irrespective of whether the latter is a necessary or a
contingent fact).4 That the impact speed was 4.4 meters/second also depends
on the fact that s 5
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
2dg
p
, and so on. That is why complete answers can cite
nonaccidental regularities in addition to citing first-level reasons why.
My second argument is concerned with the relation between the answer
to the follow-up question and the answer to the why question. Skow argues
only that the answer to the follow-up question, taken by itself, does not answer
the why question. However, one could argue that the answer to a follow-up
question such as “Why does F1 have to do with E?” complements an answer
as towhy p. The subjectmatter of follow-up questions is the property of being
a link between the event occurrence in question and the cited fact. This link
can be a further fact or a regularity, such as the gravitational law that con-
nects drop height and impact speed. Importantly, the same could not be said
regarding the cases that motivate Skow’s pragmatic good-response argument.
Take his example “Is Connor coming to the party?” (2016, 72) and as a re-
sponse “No, he is sick.” Clearly, “He is sick” is not part of an answer to the
yes-or-no question. Instead, it is an answer to the expected follow-up question
“Why isn’t he coming?” In this case, despite its relatedness, the answer to the
follow-up question does not complement an answer to the first question. The
first question is just a matter of yes or no. Follow-up questions that are con-
cerned with reasons why are different. Their answers can complement an-
swers as to why p. (This may not hold for all why questions.)4. Note that my argument does not endorse Lange’s claim that the mathematical impos-
sibility of dividing 23 by three is essential to the explanation (for this issue see Skow
[2018, 13–16]).
176 INSA LAWLERAltogether, it seems plausible that in some cases (at least complete) an-
swers to why questions cite second-level reasons why.
4. Concluding Remarks. Skow attaches great weight to the different lev-
els of reasons why. However, I have shown that the distinction does not bear
decisive weight for two claims that are at the heart of Skow’s account. Even
if one granted the distinction, his claim that correct answers to why ques-
tions cite only causes or grounds and his claim that accounts that include
citations of nonaccidental regularities in answers to why questions typically
confuse second-level reasons with first-level reasons can be refuted. The
question whether nonaccidental regularities and causes are reasons of the
same level is independent of the question what kinds of reasons are citable
in answers to why questions. I have argued that Skow’s accusation of con-
fusion is unwarranted. The true object of disagreement is what kinds of rea-
sons why are citable in answers to why questions. I have further rebutted
Skow’s argument for excluding citations of second-level reasons why in an-
swers to why questions, and I have argued that such citations can be included.
At the very least, some complete answers to why questions cite nonaccidental
regularities in addition to citing first-level reasons why. Thus, Skow’s central
claim that correct answers to why questions cite only causes or (partial)
grounds is refuted as well.REFERENCES
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